Some public organizations take on the qualities and characteristics of an institution. They become vessels for societal ambition, combining reliable performance with high levels of legitimacy. The functioning and effects of these highly institutionalized organizations are well researched. How these public institutions come about remains somewhat of a mystery, however. Empirical accounts of public institutions consistently identify leadership as a crucial explanatory variable. Conventional wisdom in the field of public administration research, on the other hand, suggests it is impossible for leaders to single-handedly create an organization that effectively serves multiple, complex, and mutually exclusive goals in a volatile environment that is characterized by impatient politicians, scrutinizing media, critical citizens, and scarce resources. This article revisits the relation between leadership and the institutionalization of public organizations. Building on theoretical work and case studies of public institutions, it formulates an analytical framework for studying the role of leadership in institutionalization processes.
legitimacy. They build a dedicated staff around a widely shared mission. They are remarkably durable, surviving environmental turbulence while preserving their identity. The public and politicians bestow their trust on them, turning these organizations into "vessels of societal aspiration" (Selznick, 1957) .
A case bank of public institutions would include, among others, the Tennessee Valley Authority (Hargrove, 1994; Selznick, 1949) , the Social Security Administration (Derthick, 1990) , the National Aeronautics and Space Agency (Murray & Cox, 1989) , the Marines Corps (Ricks, 1997) , the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Kessler, 1994) , the Port of New York Authority (Doig, 2001) , the Supreme Court (Woodward & Armstrong, 2005) , and the Federal Reserve Bank (Greider, 1989) . For better or worse, these organizations have made a lasting imprint on the American public landscape. These organizations are widely recognized as public institutions.
The workings of these public institutions have been well documented (March & Olsen, 1989; Scott, 2003; J. Q. Wilson, 1989) . Public institutions accomplish amazing feats but also cause spectacular disasters. They can serve society extremely well, but only in their own way. They often manage to protect their way of working in the face of external pressure to change, which tends to annoy political patrons and media observers. Public institutions, in short, often prove instrumental to societal ambitions, but they also evoke highly charged debates about their alleged (anti)democratic tendencies (Perrow, 1986) .
One important question remains largely unanswered, however. We know very little about the way these public organizations come about. We know what they can do, but we do not know how they gained that capacity. The origins of public institutions remain unexplored terrain (Peters, 1999; Scott, 2003) .
A select group of scholars postulates that public institutions are the outcome of strong leadership and clever design (Doig & Hargrove, 1990; Lewis, 1980) . To be sure, these scholars do not buy into (nor do they wish to sell) the "great man myth" that besets so many leadership studies (Van Wart, 2003) . Building on the classic work of Selznick (1957) , they argue that leaders play a much larger role in the development of public institutions than conventional wisdom in the field of public administration theory would allow for (cf. J. Q. Wilson, 1989) . But how exactly leaders do this remains unclear.
The field of public administration and policy research has little patience with leadership-based explanations, however (Terry, 1995; Van Wart, 2003) .
emphasize a large set of intimidating constraints that operate on the administrative capacity of leaders: These constraints range from bounded rationality to inherent control deficiencies, from political irrationalities to bureaucratic pathologies, from media scrutiny to citizen worries, from budget shortages to the market's hidden hand.
2 As a result, these theories suggest, large-scale bureaucracies are hard to manage; public administrators cannot be expected to do much more than "satisfice" and "muddle through" (Lindblom, 1979) .
In this article, we seek to reconcile these two contradictory perspectives. We formulate a theoretical framework that pinpoints the exact role that leaders and leadership play in the process of institutional development. This framework builds on case studies of public institutions, theories of institutionalization, and core insights of public administration research. We postulate that the leaders of public organizations play a limited but crucial role in the institutionalization process. Effective leaders, we hypothesize, selectively apply what we here call "design principles".
3 Their role is less pronounced than students of public institutions sometimes suggest but appears more important than conventional wisdom in public administration theory typically allows for. 4 In the second section, we set out by defining the key concepts of institutions and institutionalization. In the third section, we further "unpack" the notion of institutionalization and explain the process in terms of a norm cycle. Then, we explore how leadership can affect the institutionalization process. In the last section, we reflect on the implications for research and practice.
The Public Institution Defined
When we describe a public organization in terms of an institution, we mean to say that there is something special about that organization. It is special because it has developed a consistent and effective way of working, which is strongly valued by internal and external stakeholders. 5 The uniqueness of a public institution thus lies in the combination of two distinctive properties.
Institutions are special, first, because they have developed and incorporated an effective way of dealing with complex and mutually contradictory goals. This way of working helps employees to do their job: It tells them what works and what does not; it also helps them to make sense of the world around them. As this "adaptive belief system" proves its worth, institutional members come to value it and voluntarily reproduce it (cf. D. S. Wilson, 2002) . The "shared basic assumptions" of the organization are taught to new employees as the "correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to [problems] of external adaptation and internal integration" (Schein, 1985, p. 121; cf. March & Olsen, 1984; Weeks & Galunic, 2003) .
The U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) scores high on this first dimension of institutionalization (Boin, 2001; DiIulio, 1994) . From prison to prison, guards and wardens work according to a long-standing correctional philosophy, which translates a few core values into a sophisticated way of prison management. The BOP employees live and breathe this philosophy of "sound correctional management." Even inmates understand the BOP way of working and are generally appreciative of it. The shared culture is not limited to individual prisons but extends across the 100-plus federal facilities and includes the Washington, D.C. headquarters. The same story of a dominant culture has been told on other organizations such as the U.S. Marines, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), FBI, and the U.S. State Department. 6 Second, institutions enjoy a high level of general support: An institution is widely accepted and taken for granted. It has a distinct, legitimate identity (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) . Its way of working has become its trademark. It is valued not only for what it does but for what it is. A generalized perception or assumption exists outside the organization that the organization is "desirable, proper, or appropriate" within the socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions (Suchman, 1995, p. 574) .
NASA scored high on this second dimension during the 1960s. In its race to the moon ("before this decade is out"), the agency could count on unprecedented budgets, widespread political support (which became especially salient in times of crises), and public adoration. NASA quite literally became a vessel for societal aspirations. Other organizations that have enjoyed high levels of legitimacy for extended time periods include the FBI, Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the General Accounting Office, the New York Port Authority, and the aforementioned BOP.
Institutions are, of course, theoretical ideal types (Scott, 2003; Selznick, 1957) . Institutionalization is, in other words, a matter of degree. 7 The public sector of any country displays a remarkable variety in levels of institutionalization. Some public organizations seem to have no clear sense of purpose, no shared culture of any kind, no consistent way of working, no solid support base. Some public organizations are highly institutionalized; some used to be (the NASA of today has deinstitutionalized quite a bit since Armstrong's giant step for mankind). Most public organizations find themselves somewhere between these two extreme levels of institutionalization.
Whether institutionalization and its outcome-the public institutionare desirable is, of course, a matter of perspective (Boin, 2001; Perrow, 1986) .
Most experts agree that institutionalization enhances the effectiveness and robustness of organizations. Unfortunately, this is also true for less desirable organizations such as the mafia. In this article, we "park" the normative debate (cf. Boin and Goodin, 2007) . We accept that institutionalization can have both positive and negative consequences. In the remainder of this article, we explore how organizations develop into institutions.
From Organization to Institution
An organization is not born an institution; it becomes one. Every public institution-as we define it-begins as a newborn organization (Barnard, 1938; Selznick, 1957) . Over the years, it takes on institutional characteristics. The question is how this happens.
Governments typically create public organizations to address new challenges or persistent societal problems (cf. Thatcher, 2002) . Sometimes these organizations are created from scratch: Think of the TVA (Selznick, 1949) or the regulatory agencies set up by the European Union (Groenleer, 2006) . Other "new" organizations are "added copies" of existing organizations (a new prison or school) or the result of a merger (the U.S. Homeland Security Department serves as a prime example; Kettl, 2004) .
Once a new public organization is formally founded (e.g., by passing a law), the formal plan must be brought to life. The young organization must overcome what Stinchcombe (1965) famously referred to as the "liability of newness" (cf. Sproull, Weiner, & Wolf, 1978) . They must develop and administer effective solutions to complex problems that often change in rapid fashion and unforeseen directions. Expertise must be developed or accessed; selected solutions must be translated into structured practices, if a stable organization is to arise. The emerging structures and practices must then be sanctioned by the organization's political and societal stakeholders. A new organization thus faces a double challenge: It must build an effective way of working while maintaining (or gaining) the support of its stakeholders.
Public administration and management scholars have developed a firm body of theoretical and empirical work detailing the "fragmentary forces" that make it hard for young organizations to deal with these challenges (Hood, 1976; Kaufman, 1960; Terry, 2005; J. Q. Wilson, 1989) . The leaders of public organizations soon discover that their environments are often volatile, which confronts them with shifting priorities, inadequate funding, and irrational scrutiny. They find that employees pursue personal goals rather than organizational ones, control systems rarely work, citizens do not always cooperate, and performance critically depends on other actors (LaPorte, 1994) .
Many public organizations "muddle through" and "satisfice"-which is apparently the best we can expect (Hood, 1976; Lindblom, 1979) .
Public institutions negotiate these barriers. They somehow establish a track record of consistently high performance. They develop a way of working that satisfies conflicting official goals. They come to be seen by political and societal stakeholders as a valued feature of the public system. This durable achievement in the face of so many "fragmentary forces" earns them the title public institution (Selznick, 1957) .
Why do only some public organizations take on institutional characteristics, whereas many others do not institutionalize or do so in much lesser degree (cf. Kimberly, 1980) ? Is institutionalization governed by clever design, evolutionary forces, fate, or perhaps a combination of all? Before we address this question, let us first sketch the process by which start-up organizations become institutions.
How Public Institutions Develop: A Phase Model of Institutionalization
In this section, we take a closer look at the sequence of processes through which a public organization acquires institutional characteristics. We describe this process of institutionalization in terms of a "norm cycle" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998) . This cycle has five phases, which we discuss below.
The Development of Effective Practice
The first challenge for any public organization is the translation of formal goals into effective working practices. In the public sector, new organizations generally do not formulate the formal goals found in their charters; these are usually imposed upon them. Formal goals tend to be multiple, complex, vague, symbolic, mutually conflictive, and subject to constant interpretative shifts. Moreover, these goals do not come with a clear set of implementation instructions. The organization must reconcile the goals without causing collateral damage (angry clients, dissatisfied stakeholders, gross inefficiencies, etc.). It must invent or adopt a way of working that is both effective and legitimate.
Most public organizations are founded to deal with new-or newly recognized-problems, which require an exploration of new solutions. Many of these goals are simply impossible to accomplish (rid our societies of crime, prevent disasters, find terrorists, heal the sick; Hargrove & Glidewell, 1990) . When policy makers do find a way to achieve one goal, they usually discover that it violates another.
A core dilemma of institutional design originates in the tension between exploiting some established legitimate model and the exploration of new solutions (cf. Dunbar & Garud, 2005; March, 1991) . Societal and political stakeholders usually grant a young public organization very little time to develop solutions. Elements of the problem may have been dealt with successfully by others, or the problem itself may have been dealt with effectively in other countries. But it is never self-evident which practices can be safely copied and which ones may have unintended and undesirable consequences. In their search for effective practices, organizational leaders are constrained by the institutional inheritance that befalls a new public organization (Goodin, 1996; Pierson, 2004; Stinchcombe, 1965) . 10 The "building blocks" of which a new organization is assembled are important: "The initial form of social architecture of an institution, though underdetermining of its future form, does militate against certain paths of institutional evolution while facilitating others" (Hay, 2001, p. 195) . In addition, the "starting capital" of a new organization (formal laws, political commitment, available resources) affects the search process. Public organizations rarely receive the means required to fulfill the aims imposed on them.
The Emergence of a Norm
Institutionalization proceeds when an effective practice gives rise to a norm of practice (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003) . A norm can be cognitive (explaining how the developed practice helps to accomplish the goal), regulative (instructing the employee to perform the practice), or normative (strongly suggesting that the practice is appropriate; Scott, 2003) .
A norm is most likely to emerge when it is based on the proven function of the practice (Feldman & Pentland, 2003; March & Olsen, 2005; Schein, 1985; Stinchcombe, 2001; Weeks & Galunic, 2003) . The practice must be considered effective, not only in terms of goal accomplishment but also in terms of uncertainty reduction. Employees must consider it effective as an energy-saving cognitive device, which spares them the trouble of search and trial processes.
11 The norm must create "an abstraction in such a way that it can be taken as a 'fact,' so that most people, most of the time, do not have to go behind it"; a norm must "make the abstractions in it an effective representation of the problems and solutions in an area of social life" (Stinchcombe, 2001, pp. 2, 10) . It must increase the cognitive adequacy of an employee's action repertoire; it must be communicable; and, ideally, it should "have a trajectory of improvement so that it can track changes in the world" (Stinchcombe, 2001, pp. 35-41; cf. Goodin, 1996) .
Accepting the Norm
For institutionalization to occur, the emerging norm must become accepted within the organization. Through an "agreement process" (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998) , employees must reach consensus about the validity, functionality, and appropriateness of that norm. Somehow people must come to see an emerging practice as the preferable way of going about one's task. The norm reaches a "tipping point" after a certain critical mass of actors is convinced and helps the norm "cascade" throughout the organization.
Acceptance can be a fluent process of escalating commitment: Employees tend to imitate effective practices. As more people abide by the norm, the pressure to conform bears down on a dwindling group of nonabiders. Sunk costs and vested interests make embarking on different paths costly and uncertain, but it can happen: A freshly accepted norm may be rapidly discarded as people begin to doubt its validity and functionality.
Three conditions increase the chance that employees voluntarily converge on a norm. First, they must trust the way by which the norm has been abstracted from the work practice (Stinchcombe, 2001) . Those who have not developed the underlying work practice themselves must believe that the people who advocate the norm know what they are talking about. For people to trust a norm enough to believe that they need not "go behind the formalities to the raw substance," there have to be mechanisms in the governance system that "render abstractions authoritative" (Stinchcombe, 2001, p. 11) .
Second, the emerging norm can only win widespread approval if it fits with the cultural traditions and core values of the organization (Brunsson & Olsen, 1993) . In public organizations, it may be unclear what the core values are. Indeed, as Selznick (1957, p. 62) observed, it may require "a selfassessment to discover the true commitments of the organization." The acceptance of a norm that does not fit with core values, manifest or disguised, will create tensions that sooner or later will destroy the consensus underlying the norm. Correspondingly, a norm will be more easily accepted when it is considered appropriate for and in the organization.
Third, emerging norms must fit the power constellations in an organization if the norm is to survive. Public organizations are rarely if ever homogeneous. They consist of factions and subgroups, which are organized in separate units and divisions. At this stage of the norm cycle, political considerations replace functional arguments. The acceptance of crucial norms-crucial for they determine the character of the organization-heavily depends on political criteria (cf. Metcalfe, 1981; Pfeffer, 1978) .
Embedding the Norm
Institutionalization reaches a critical threshold when the accepted norm becomes "routinized" in the organization. To make a norm "stick," it must become embedded in policy paradigms, operational routines, control mechanisms, training manuals, hiring and firing, and promotion practices. Once the norm is firmly embedded, the organization gains coherence. A wellestablished norm relieves organizational leaders of the necessity to rely on a full-blown command and control system, which makes the organization more efficient (Barnard, 1938) . Widespread abidance by the norm enhances organizational effectiveness and tends to strengthen its position (the organization gains praise from its stakeholders).
Emerging norms may be at odds with the formal structure of the organization, however. Young organizations tend to develop the formal dimension relatively quickly, whereas the development of a norm tends to take more time (Simon, 1997) . As a result, structure and instruments are not tailored to the norm. Organizational leaders may be tempted to compromise the norm to make it fit structure and means. Public organizations can find a way out of this conundrum by decoupling formal structure and informal norms of practice (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Thompson, 1967) . This effectively undercuts the norm, however, as the structure should serve it rather than hide it (for institutionalization to occur).
If a norm is not firmly anchored in the organization's structure and culture, it will erode. New recruits may not accept routinized ways of working, based on their experience within other organizations. The "discovery" of new technology can shake the faith in the effectiveness of prevailing norms. Internal conflict may arise between different factions over the future course of the institution and the challenges that lay ahead. Sloppy management can gradually undermine institutional practices, eventually resulting in a gap between performance and external expectations. A norm must be continuously protected from internal corrosion.
Legitimizing the Norm
A public institution has a distinct identity that is appreciated, accepted, and trusted by stakeholders (Hargrove & Glidewell, 1990; Selznick, 1957) . A public organization that builds its identity around questionable or unacceptable practices is unlikely to escape public scrutiny and political intervention. For institutionalization to proceed, a public organization needs to select and routinize not only solutions that work but solutions that fit with prevalent values and norms in its environment (cf. Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Weeks & Galunic, 2003) .
Legal constraints, political cross fires, media hypes, and a skeptic public opinion make it hard to create an effective organization that is also appreciated externally. The perennial twin threats of periodic budget cuts and shifting political priorities always hover above the organizational future. All this makes the acquirement of a sound legitimacy base something akin to "an impossible job" (Hargrove & Glidewell, 1990) .
Young public organizations sometimes enjoy a "honeymoon period" in which they can set up shop, hire people, and develop an effective way of working.
12 But even for these young organizations it is crucial to "score" initial successes and, perhaps more important, avoid evident failures. Public failures focus attention on the organization, which puts the institutionalization process under pressure. Moreover, most young organizations are formally evaluated by external bodies within a few years of their early existence. A negative assessment will seriously undermine whatever norms have been institutionalized at that point.
Soon after the honeymoon is over, the young organization will experience the tension that derives from two distinct pressures operating on each public organization. On the one hand, an organization must embed sanctioned norms firmly into the organization, to create the coherence required to perform. But a public organization-an upstart especially-must also be responsive to its environment. This requires that the organization absorbs new demands and adapts its structure and policy ideas when necessary.
A norm that is widely considered legitimate may become controversial in time. Institutionalization therefore requires continuous adaptation to maintain a fit between the identity of a young organization and its everchanging environment. This is hard for organizations, especially for those in the public sector (Selznick, 1957; J. Q. Wilson, 1989) . Some organization theorists claim that it is virtually impossible: They argue that an effective practice will inevitably give rise to inertia and conservative reflexes (D. Miller, 1999; Sitkin, 1992) . This is the paradox of success: The more successful an organization is at delivering on its promise, the harder it becomes to adapt when stakeholders change their minds.
Summary: The Dynamics of Institutionalization
Institutionalization is not a linear process in which the phases of the norm cycle follow one another in the ideal-typical sense described above. It is a dynamic process. A period of institutionalization can be interrupted by a phase of deinstitutionalization (Røvik, 1996) . Temporary deinstitutionalization may occur when established norms do not pass the test of practice. Violent episodes of institutional deconstruction, in turn, may give rise to relatively peaceful phases of institutionalization.
Institutionalization is punctuated by several critical points (cf. Rodrigues & Child, 2003) . The first marks the transition from the explorative phase to the norm emergence phase-and vice versa. This is the point at which tested solutions become accepted ways of working, after which the embedding process can begin. Embedded solutions may, of course, fail future tests, which forces the institutionalization process back to the previous stage. A different type of critical point presents itself when the institutional fabric is rejected by a majority of the stakeholders after which the process begins anew (Alink, Boin, & 't Hart, 2001) .
Institutionalization consists of parallel processes: A young public organization attempts to develop various norms in its efforts to translate complex goals into desirable outcomes. As a result, it is typically involved in various stages of multiple norm cycles, which makes the process highly complex and hard to manage. All this compounds the vulnerability of the institutionalization process.
We thus begin to understand why so few public organizations develop into respected institutions. The barriers are manifold and hard to negotiate. Yet, some public organizations apparently manage to do just that.
Building a Public Institution: Principles of Design
Are public institutions random products of organizational change and adaptation or the outcome of some sort of institutional design? Empirical research suggests that institutionalization is not a matter of happenstance but the outcome of effective leadership (Kimberley, 1980; Selznick, 1957; J. Q. Wilson, 1989 ). When we speak of leadership, we do not refer to some charismatic "entrepreneur" that lifts an organization off the ground and single-handedly forges it into an institution. Leadership in our definition refers to the application of certain strategies and practices-we call them design principles-that guide a young organization through the norm cycle.
13
By dissecting the institutionalization process in terms of a norm cycle, it becomes possible to pinpoint which specific mechanisms of orchestration institutional leaders apply to guide an organization through this process of organizational discovery and development. We draw from empirical case studies and institutional theories a set of design principles that, we hypothesize, institutional leaders use to facilitate and guide the institutionalization process. These principles are different for each phase of institutionalization, as each stage requires a different "logic" (Campbell & Pedersen, 2001, p. 264; cf. Hodgson, 2002) .
14 We hypothesize that institution builders effectively apply a select set of design principles, which we discuss below.
Design Principle 1: Institution builders facilitate trial-and-error processes in the pursuit of effective practices.
Effective practices are not designed behind a policy maker's desk. They come about through a process of trial and error: The organization experiments to find the most effective and efficient way of accomplishing complex and conflicting goals. Effective practices are "discovered" or identified as the learned product of group experience (cf. Hedberg, 1981; Levitt & March, 1990; Simon, 1996; Weick, 1995; cf. Collins & Porras, 1994) . Institution builders facilitate this process: They allow operators or experts the room and the means to devise and test a variety of practices that may help to achieve the organization's goals (March, 1981) . They tolerate slack and accept that it makes the organization less efficient (Thompson, 1967; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2002) .
Institutionalization does not require visionary leaders who impose a way of working on the young organization (cf. Collins & Porras, 1994; Terry, 1995; Van Wart, 2003) . To be sure, it certainly helps when leaders have good ideas. Leaders with a long background in the field may indeed have a precise idea how officials should go about their task. But leaders cannot singlehandedly define the new technology by which employees should implement the new goals. It is simply impossible to prescribe in exact detail how streetlevel bureaucrats should go about their job, certainly in the absence of any precedence (which is usually the case in a new organization; Lipsky, 1980) . Institution builders understand that "operatives" are most likely to invent or adopt ways of working that will help to achieve the goals of their organization. They encourage and facilitate experimentation; they make it possible for employees to learn from other organizations. They savor and exploit the ambiguity of the organization's formal goals, which provides room for trial and error (cf. Gehry, 2004; Selznick, 1957) . Once this "liquid state" is followed by a solidified interpretation, short-term horizons and a focus on immediate returns become serious constraints to experiments. Institution builders prolong this state of ambiguity to allow effective practices to materialize.
In 1998, the Netherlands Competition Authority opened its doors. The pioneering officials had to find a working solution for two critical problems. First, they had to decide how to process and assess announced mergers; the law decreed that such an assessment had to be made within 30 days. The founding leaders did not reinvent the wheel but sent their employees to sister agencies in Germany and Brussels (EU) to copy their practices. The second problem required more experimentation: Nobody knew how to "bust" trusts. The "trust busters" formulated a first plan (the null hypothesis), which was subsequently revised as they learned what worked and what did not. After 1 year, they had developed a way of working that was ready to be routinized. Several years down the road, the method is still being perfected. Meanwhile, the authority has become a respected (and feared) institution in the Dutch economic landscape.
Design Principle 2:
Institution builders closely monitor the process by which norms emerge and direct the process through which these norms become accepted as the organization's norms.
Institution builders play a much more dominant role when it comes to the sanctioning of emergent norms. They closely monitor which norms emerge and scrutinize them in light of formal goals, core values, and external expectations. They immediately intervene when undesirable norms take root, and they actively (and visibly) endorse norms that are considered acceptable and functional.
All this presumes that institutional leaders know what is happening in their organization. In well-institutionalized organizations, we often see some form of "managing by walking around" (MBWA). This practice helps leaders to understand the problems their operators wrestle with and allows them to weigh the solutions that operators develop in practice. Leaders may use other ways of begetting organizational intelligence (Wilensky, 1967 ), but few instruments can replace the intense experience that MBWA provides (cf. DiIulio, 1987) .
Many leaders of public organizations cannot seem to find the time to engage in close monitoring of operational affairs. They may be busy dealing with the outside world or with pacifying feuding elites. They simply may not appreciate the practice. Without a good understanding of the organization's business, however, leaders are unlikely to select the best norms or-even worse perhaps-may sanction the wrong ones.
Institution builders assess emergent norms in light of the mission they envision for their organization. They do not perform this sanctioning function by themselves. If a norm is to survive, it needs the support of the organizational elites that must help diffuse and protect the norm (Selznick, 1957) . Institution builders organize a political process in which the decisionmaking elite of the organization explicitly discusses the emerged norm. Before according the norm, they make sure it meets three criteria.
First, the norm must be effective. An emergent norm does not necessarily capture the best practice. Employees tend to agree on the best available practice. Institution builders understand this and assess whether the norm properly describes the organization's "core technology" by which "raw material" is transformed into organizational output (Thompson, 1967) . They judge whether it provides employees with a clear guide for action that helps them to negotiate their discretionary freedom (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003) .
Second, a norm should help to define the distinctive competence of an organization. A good norm communicates to insiders and outsiders alike what skills or capacities set this organization apart from other organizations. This means that the norm should be simple and evocative (Sapolsky, 1972; Walker, 1986) . It should be easy to comprehend, and it should have an inherent appeal to both organizational members and environmental stakeholders. It must be applicable at all levels of organization. Line administrators and senior policy makers must be able to use the same technical philosophy as a frame of reference for solving what often are unique dilemmas.
Feasibility is a third criterion. A norm must be acceptable to both internal and external stakeholders (we will return to this point shortly) and must reflect existing capacities. It must reconcile policy goals rather than sacrificing one or more for the sake of others (Wolf, 1999) . It should not be a flight into abstraction.
The men who built NASA into an institution exemplify the use of this design principle (Lambright, 1990) . In the early days of the Apollo project, NASA gave its engineers all the room they needed to develop the technology that would have to fly a man to the moon (and return him safely). Jim Webb, NASA's chief executive, presided over the independent centers that developed the various components of space technology. He "never tried to make technical decisions himself." But when the center directors could not agree on a way of working that had become a norm in one of the centers, Webb and his close colleagues cut the knot. They would "override a technical decision for non-technical reasons" (Murray & Bly Cox, 1989, p. 72) . They assessed emerging norms in light of NASA's political well-being (Lambright, 1990) .
Design Principle 3: Institution builders play an active role when it comes to the embedding of accepted norms within an organization.
An embedded norm is not the product of circumstance (Boin, 2001 ). Institution builders apply a variety of administrative tools that help to "inculcate" the members of an organization with the way "things are done around here" (Barnard, 1938; Kaufman, 1960; March & Olsen, 1989; Schein, 1985; Selznick, 1957) . To embed a sanctioned norm in the organization, they make sure two things happen.
First, they adapt the structure of the organization to the norm. They pay much attention to the way action is programmed and to the development of deviation-detecting mechanisms (Kaufman, 1960; Schein, 1985) . They understand that control mechanisms can only work when they serve a twoway function: correction and communication. Effective control systems detect deviation but also open additional and structural channels of communication through which the norm is confirmed, adapted, explained, and criticized where necessary.
Second, institution builders apply a variety of techniques to influence the "zone of acceptance" of their workforce.
15 They make sure selection criteria reflect the norms of the organization. Moreover, they do not leave it up to chance whether members conform or not. They make sure new employees are "indoctrinated" with the core values, founding ideologies, myths, and rules of the organization (cf. Barnard, 1938) . When employees share a similar professional background, training sessions serve as gentle reminders of key values and crucial procedures. When they share less powerful background values (e.g., a college degree), more serious efforts are needed to generate a shared identity. If recruits have very little in common, training programs become the pivotal aspect of the inculcation effort. Institution builders consider personnel issues-in many organizations not an issue of executive attention-a matter of permanent consideration.
The leaders of budding institutions typically take on the role of educator (cf. March & Olsen, 1984, p. 739) . Core values are identified and defined by paying attention to, measuring, and controlling certain organizational aspects and outcomes while ignoring others; by leadership reactions to critical incidents and organizational crises; and by deliberate teaching and coaching efforts (Schein, 1985) . Institutional values are further promoted by public relations efforts, the use of symbols, and the creation of organizational myths and legends that convey a message about the historical origins of these values and the effectiveness of these values through the years (Brunsson, 1989; Clark, 1972; Hargrove, 1994; Ricks, 1997) .
The U.S. Forest Service provides a classic example (Kaufman, 1960) . How to ensure that the rangers would abide by organizational norms once they are out in the woods? Under the early leader, Gifford Pinchot, an elaborate system of programming and control was set up for the rangers. With a precision reminiscent of scientific management efforts, the rangers had most of their working day planned for them in minute detail. Rangers were required to keep diaries and could expect regular on-the-spot inspections of their district. The service selected "men who fit." In addition, every effort was made to instill in the rangers those norms and values that defined the organization (the rangers were frequently transferred to "build identification with the service as a whole"). The success of this institution-effective and well respected-"rests heavily on manipulation of the perceptions, thinking, and values of members of the Service" (Kaufman, 1960, pp. 177, xiii) .
Design Principle 4: Institution builders continuously adapt the organization without compromising its identity.
Most public start-ups are forced to compromise their identity to find a place in their environment-a compromise that often halts the internal development of the organization. Institution builders deploy three crucial strategies that help balance internal development against changing demands and expectations in the outside world: They actively work to establish autonomy, they are concerned with issues of reliability, and they engage in crisis management.
Autonomy
Institution builders understand the crucial importance of autonomy and work hard to create it (Carpenter, 2001; Drezner, 2000; Meier, 1989; Sapolsky, 1972) . Young organizations need a degree of autonomy, which permits them to develop their distinctive values, competence, and role. Autonomy serves to minimize outside interference through the establishment of a "relatively undisputed jurisdiction" within the organization's domain of action (J. Q. Wilson, 1989, p. 183) . 16 Autonomy partially depends on the legal charters underlying the birth of the organization. But it also depends on the ability of organizational leaders to build and maintain a sufficient level of support for their programs and activities.
A particularly effective strategy is the formulation of a favorable "agency myth." Every public organization must explain the inevitable discrepancy between its "impossible" goals and its actual performance. An agency myth does exactly that. It defines the organization's goals and practices as altruistic and civilized (Hargrove & Glidewell, 1990) . It makes it understood that the official aims reflect ambitious and laudable intentions (e.g., solve the poverty problem) but cannot be achieved with the available means and technology. As a result, the discrepancy between official goal statements and actual performance comes to be taken for granted (Brunsson, 1989) .
Institution builders also use the strategy of co-optation, which aims to "silence" (potential) critics by bringing them on board and having them share responsibility (Selznick, 1949) . In seeking support for the development of the Polaris missile, the Special Projects Office depended on the positive appraisals of leading scientists with regard to the feasibility of projected technological progress. A substantial amount of money was set aside to placate the scientific community. For instance, all suggestions made by outside scientists, no matter how irrelevant, were followed up with funding for research (Sapolsky, 1972) .
Institution builders instill a sense of moderation into the institution and its employees. They know that institutional greed invites public scrutiny. They understand that public organizations must stress frugality as a core value. Moreover, they refrain from unnecessary public attacks on bureaucratic competitors. Institutions are most effective in gaining autonomy when they attract least attention. Institutional modesty is well-served by transparency (Luban, 1996) . Effective leaders open their organization to politicians, judges, media representatives, and taxpayers. They explain what is being done and why.
17
Institution builders manage to create an image of unique managerial competence. The Special Projects Organization became a model for other development organizations, public and private, as a result of its program evaluation and review technique (PERT) system (Sapolsky, 1972) . PERT was carefully marketed as a self-invented management model that actually helped to keep large-scale projects within time and cost limits. Even though the capacity of PERT was more myth than reality, it fostered an image of responsible and professional public management.
The men who built the U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons into one of the best and most respected correctional systems in the world (in the 1930s and 1940s) used these strategies (Boin, 2001 ). They actively "sold" their pronounced ideas on modern corrections to external stakeholders. Politicians and judges were routinely invited to attend warden conferences, during which bureau policy was discussed. Media were invited into the prisons. The young agency managed to create Federal Prisons Industries, a governmentowned corporation that would use inmate labor for the production of goods for sale to the government only. Its boards of directors included representatives from business and labor to ensure that the corporation's product lines would not become a source of unfair competition (a big concern in the depression-ridden 1930s).
High Reliability
Institutionalization requires more than adequate public relations management. Institution builders understand that to survive external scrutiny, the organization must reliably perform its critical tasks. They never assume that the institution "runs itself," even if it seems that way (Weeks & Galunic, 2003 , p. 1335 . They concern themselves with all events that touch on the basic tenets of the institution. They advocate core values and act on violations of critical norms. They "walk the walk" and "talk the talk." Institution builders are especially concerned with the avoidance of critical errors. They encourage employees to report errors and near misses. They actively pursue reports that hint at organizational deficiencies. They emphasize the need to learn from errors, recognizing them as opportunities for further development (cf. Weick & Sutcliffe, 2002; Wildavsky, 1972) .
Institution builders continually monitor the relation between the institution and its environment. They invest much time in talking to external stakeholders, listening to complaints, monitoring perceptions. They act on complaints, as they know that lingering dissatisfaction can easily detonate into an institutional crisis. Institution builders, in short, invest in a culture of critical inquiry. They emphasize "a combination of respectful interaction, communication, trust, firsthand knowledge of the technology, attentiveness, familiarity with one another's roles, and experience. This combination of capabilities enables people to deal with dynamic nonevents, and to keep the unexpected as a nonevent" (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2002, p. 31) .
Institution builders also tolerate "strategic deviants" in the organization (J. Miller, 1994) . These individuals regularly violate crucial behavioral norms, which are directly related to institutionalized ways of working.
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They are tolerated, because their brilliance has proved vitally important in finding new courses of action, which, ultimately, may ensure institutional survival in troubled times. The awkward yet permanent presence of these critics helps to keep the institution prepared for flexible adaptation.
Crisis Management
Young public organizations typically work with partially developed technologies.
This requires different modes of organizing, known as exploitation and exploration (March, 1991) . Both modes will cause occasional bouts of "data indeterminacy"-moments where the organizational repertoire is shown incapable of dealing with an emerging problem (Dunbar & Garud, 2005) . These urgent anomalies create unrest and undermine faith in the developed practices.
Institutionalization, in other words, is punctuated by crises (cf. Baumgartner & Jones, 1993) : Established norms will be found not to work in certain situations, which is likely to create internal upheaval and external criticism. The "way of doing things" is no longer feasible when seen in the light of present and future problems. Adaptation is then necessary.
Institution builders treat crises as defining moments for institutionalization. They know that if a crisis is not immediately resolved, loss of societal and political support is likely. Within a relatively short time period, they develop a line of action that addresses both the source of legitimacy loss and the consequences of the crisis. They use these crisis periods to initiate a strategic change of values, tasks, technology, or structure to repair legitimacy. They understand when the organization should "switch" from exploitation to exploration and can bring the organization back to the first phase of the norm cycle without alienating employees or stakeholders.
Institution builders recognize that crises present an opportunity for adaptation. They create opportunities for breakthroughs that are unthinkable or simply politically infeasible in normal times. They understand that, rather than attempting restoration and a return to "proven successes," they may be better off anticipating and instigating new ways of working and organizing. They understand, in other words, the importance of resilience (Freeman, Hirschhorn, & Maltz, 2004; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2002) .
Conclusion: Reassessing Institutional Leadership
One of the biggest clichés in the social sciences reminds us that "institutions matter." This piece of conventional wisdom also applies to the institutions discussed in this article. Public institutions make a difference-perhaps not all the time or in the way one would like to see it, but they do matter. We understand why and how public institutions make a difference. Their origins, however, are less well understood.
We do know why public organizations often fail to develop into fullblown institutions. The field of public administration research and theory has built a remarkable track record when it comes to explaining why policy intentions do not materialize and why public organizations typically underperform. We have come to understand-and defend-that public organizations cannot always deliver on the promises made by politicians.
These same theories cannot always explain why some public organizations do what so many others apparently cannot do. Why do some public institutions combine organizational capacity to produce envisioned outputs with high levels of societal and political acceptance, whereas many others do not? The field has put relatively little effort in trying to answer this question (it spent considerably more energy denouncing public institutions for their alleged democratic shortcomings). This is, we argue, a problem that needs to be addressed. The need for public institutions is greater than ever (cf. Terry, 2005) . We need public organizations that command respect in the political arena and effectively address societal problems. We need public organizations that can make political trade-offs in a way that benefits the common good. Public institutions, as we defined them, appear especially adept at doing this.
Public administration theorists should try to understand under which conditions public institutions emerge. In this article, we have sought to bridge this gap between the explanations offered by students of public institutions and the time-proven theoretical pillars of the field. We have argued that leadership is not necessarily the province of power-hungry individuals (they do exist, of course). In fact, we have formulated a framework in which leadership plays a predominantly facilitative role, intervening at select moments only. The art of leadership-and here we follow Selznick (1957) once again-is to recognize those crucial moments in which leaders must make critical decisions.
We postulate that institution builders apply a set of "design principles" that help an organization to negotiate the currents of institutionalization. The design principles deduced from institutional histories should be treated as hypotheses for future research. A long-term research effort into the organizational histories of public institutions is needed to establish whether they can be confirmed. If these principles are found to distinguish between lowly and highly institutionalized organizations, the field of public administration research may help to build better public leaders and better public organizations.
Notes
1. This adversity toward leadership may be due to the controversial nature of public institutions (Terry, 1995; Wamsley, 1990) . Some academics find institutions unpalatable with ideals of democracy and individual development (Denhardt, 1984; Perrow, 1986) . Well-known examples-from the FBI to the German Schutzstaffeln (SS)-lend support to their arguments. 290 Administration & Society 2. A collection of influential publications underscoring these points would include Hood (1976) , Lipsky (1980) , Kaufman (1981) , Denhardt (1984) , and Perrow (1986) . See Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2003) for a more recent summary of fragmentary forces. Some argue that the field has paid too much attention to the documentation and explanation of failure factors. "What has often dominated public management discussions", McGregor (1993) wrote, "is a cataloguing of program failure, cutbacks, decline, and misadventures of public policy and public administration" (p. 174).
3. We should add a disclaimer here: The facilitative and selective leadership style that we identify in this article may not work well during other phases of institutionalization. For instance, effective leaders who seek to deinstitutionalize their organization (to rid the organization of engrained dysfunctional values) probably apply a very different "turnaround" approach (see, e.g., Nutt, 2004) .
4. Or sociologists, who have long described institutionalization first and foremost as a largely unintended and unplanned process (Hughes, 1946) . New institutionalists differ on the sources of institutionalization but agree on the autonomous nature of the process (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991) . See Selznick (1996) for an effort to reconcile the various perspectives.
5. Selznick (1957) famously described institutions as organizations that have been "infused with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand" (p. 17; cf. Barnard, 1938; Egeberg, 2003; Scott, 2003) .
6. These institutional histories are found in Ricks (1997) , Lambright (1995) , Gentry (1991) , and Halperin (1974) .
7. We use the term institution here as shorthand for a highly institutionalized organization (which would be the technically correct label).
8. One line of critique holds that institutionalization leads to organizational rigidity (see, e.g., Brewer, 1989 ; for a more even-handed discussion, see Feldman & Pentland, 2003) . In this perspective, institutions cannot adapt in a timely and effective manner to inevitable changes in the institution's environment. A second line articulates a fear that institutions produce undemocratic, even immoral behavior. The institutionalized bureaucracy is associated with intellectual blueprints, aloof technocrats, and undesirable autonomy vis-à-vis its political masters.
9. The short-term certainty of exploitation may be offset by the long-term potential benefits of exploration. It could be hypothesized that exploitation "wins" until the costs of maintaining/copying preexisting patterns becomes higher than the costs of investing in a new pattern or activity.
10. The "politics of founding" is a subject in itself, which we will not further discuss in this article.
11. It must relieve social actors of the burden of deciding case by case (Lanzara, 1998) . A norm implies that the action in question may be performed again in the future in the same manner and with the same economical effort. It carries with it the important psychological gain that choices are narrowed. According to Zijderveld (2000) , a norm provides "psychological relief"-"habitualization provided the direction and the specification of activity that is lacking in man's biological equipment"-"it frees energy"-it opens up a foreground of deliberation and innovation (p. 53).
12. They may not always be granted one, however. If the "politics of founding" were characterized by controversy, the start-up may be subject of political and societal scrutiny from the start (see, e.g., the Department for Homeland Security).
13. Leadership and design principles are perceived here as the province of organizational elites (cf. Selznick, 1957) . In the words of Machiavelli (1983) , "Though but one person suffices for the purpose of organization, what he has organized will not last long if it continues to rest on the shoulders of one man, but may well last if many remain in charge and many look to its maintenance" (p. 132).
14. The emergence of a norm seems to be driven by functional mechanisms (Does it work?), the acceptance of the norm by considerations of appropriateness (Should we really do this?), and the preservation of a norm by considerations of survival (Can we really get away with non-adaptation?).
15. The term is taken from Simon (1997) , who, in turn, referred to Barnard's (1938) "zone of indifference in each individual within which orders are acceptable without conscious questioning of their authority" (p. 167).
16. No public organization can, of course, ever hope to reach complete freedom from interference, as there will (and should) always be a minimal degree of democratic control. Autonomy is therefore contextually defined; it is related to the framework of the political system in general and the prevailing values operating within the specific public policy domain (Terry, 1995) .
17. Institutions may not be able to show everything (a degree of secrecy is indispensable in, for instance, matters of national security or privacy). Secrecy is not problematic as long as leaders can explain why secrecy is essential (Luban, 1996) .
18. Ricks (1997) reported that some "eccentric officers" are "indulged" in the U.S. Marines (p. 248). In the early years of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Max Faget played this role (Murray & Bly Cox, 1989) .
19. The term technology refers here to the means by which raw material is transformed into output (Thompson, 1967) .
